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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Eileen Cowell, Richard Cowell, Sylvester Pany, and 
Eastgate Land & Development Corp. (collectively"plaintiffs") 
brought takings and due process claims pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. S 1983, as well as various state law claims, against 
Palmer Township, various township officials, and the 
Township's law firm (collectively "defendants"). The basis for 
these claims was the defendants' alleged interference in the 
plaintiffs' land development plans, specifically the 
imposition of two municipal liens on the plaintiffs' 
properties in 1992 and 1993. The District Court dismissed 
the federal law claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 
declined to allow plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, 
and further dismissed the state law claims without 




FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Eileen Cowell, Richard Cowell, and Sylvester Pany were 
owners of Eastgate Land & Development Corp. ("Eastgate"), 
a Pennsylvania real estate development company that 
owned a 23-acre parcel of land in Palmer Township, 
Pennsylvania known as the Palmer Business Park. In 1987, 
the plaintiffs began a three phase project to improve the 
land for development. This project was subject to the local 
land use codes of Palmer Township. Defendants Robert 
Lammi, Jeffrey Young, Robert Elliot, Robert Wasser, and H. 
Robert Daws were on the Township's Board of Supervisors 
at all relevant times. Defendant Virginia S. Rickert was also 
on the board and served as the Treasurer of Palmer 
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Township. Defendant Theodore Borek was the Township's 
Director of Planning. Defendant Donald Himmelreich was 
the Solicitor for Palmer Township, and his law firm, 
Hemstreet, Himmelreich & Nitchkey, served as counsel to 
the Township. 
 
Appellants planned to sell lots to McDonalds and 
Kentucky Fried Chicken for the development of restaurants, 
as well as to build a shopping mall to be called Eastgate 
Mall. Before contracts could be signed to finalize these 
plans, the Township allegedly changed the zoning 
classification of these lots from commercial use to"planned 
office buildings," thereby preventing the development of 
these commercial enterprises. Eastgate sued to prevent 
these zoning changes from taking effect. Plaintiffs allege, 
and defendants do not deny, that the parties reached a 
settlement in which Eastgate agreed to cease its plans to 
build the Eastgate Mall and the Township agreed to 
approve all projects that had already been proposed for 
Phases I, II, and II(a) at Palmer Business Park as well as 
assume responsibility for certain municipal improvements. 
But when Eastgate proceeded with the development of 
Phase II, the Township allegedly imposed a building 
moratorium in July 1987 which prohibited any and all 
commercial development of the property and caused severe 
financial hardship for Eastgate. 
 
It is the allegations of the events occurring after 1990 
that are most relevant to this appeal. Beginning in 1990, 
the plaintiffs worked to improve Lots 12 through 17 of 
Palmer Business Park in order to sell them as buildable 
lots. On October 22, 1992, the Township imposed a 
$25,000 lien on Lots 14 and 15, naming Richard Cowell 
and Nicholas J. Pugliese as owners of those lots. The lien 
was filed "on the basis of anticipated non-payment of the 
installation of certain municipal improvements." App. at 
206. 
 
The Township explains that the lien was imposed 
pursuant to an agreement that Cowell and Pugliese would 
be responsible for paying for paving work on a subdivision 
called Milford Street, with the Township serving as the 
guarantor. The Township contends that when neither 
Cowell nor Pugliese paid the paving contractor on time, the 
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Township paid the bill and then imposed the lien. The 
plaintiffs respond that Richard Cowell had sold his interest 
in Milford Street to Pugliese in 1991 and should not have 
been responsible for any municipal improvements. More 
important, they argue that the lien was unlawful under the 
Municipal Lien Code, 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 7101 et 
seq., because no improvements were made on Lots 14 and 
15 for which a lien could be legally placed. They further 
argue that the Township imposed the lien to retaliate 
against them for successfully challenging the Township's 
zoning changes in 1987 and to cause financial harm to the 
plaintiffs. 
 
On March 9, 1993, the Township imposed a second 
municipal lien in the amount of $250,000 on the 
subdivisions of Palmer Business Park owned by Eastgate. 
This lien was filed "for present and future unfunded escrow 
review accounts and unfunded escrow accounts for 
municipal improvements." App. at 209. On March 24, 
1993, Himmelreich sent a letter to Eastgate on behalf of the 
Township explaining that the lien was intended to serve as 
a security for (1) the anticipated failure by Eastgate to 
complete municipal improvements and (2) the unlawful 
depletion of funds held in an escrow account for the 
Township's benefit, accomplished by Richard and Eileen 
Cowell forging signatures of various township officials in 
order to obtain the release of various funds held in escrow. 
 
The Cowells had indeed pled guilty to forgery and theft by 
receipt of stolen property. However, the plaintiffs contend 
that the reference to the Cowells' criminal conduct was a 
smokescreen and that the $250,000 lien was imposed for 
the municipal improvements only. They further allege that 
the Township refused to remove this lien even after it was 
informed that the plaintiffs had sufficient funds to pay for 
the municipal improvements. 
 
In April 1994, Eastgate filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petition. As part of their Plan of Reorganization, Eastgate 
agreed to pay $30,000 to the Township in exchange for a 
discharge of the $250,000 lien. Eileen Cowell also filed for 
personal bankruptcy. During Eileen Cowell's bankruptcy 
proceeding, the bankruptcy judge lifted and expunged the 
$25,000 lien on July 13, 1998, and thereafter noted in the 
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amended order that "a municipal improvement lien cannot 
be filed against a property not so improved." App. at 222-223.1 
Specifically, the bankruptcy judge found that Lot 14 was 
not affected or benefitted by the improvements done on 
Milford Street, which was one mile away and in a separate 
development. 
 
On June 25, 1999, Eileen Cowell, Richard Cowell, 
Sylvester Pany, and Eastgate filed the present suit against 
Palmer Township, various township officials, and the 
Township's law firm. The complaint alleges that the 
imposition of the two municipal liens violated the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as various state 
laws. 
 
The defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The defendants 
asserted, inter alia, that the actions alleged did not amount 
to a taking and that the takings claim was not yet ripe. The 
defendants further asserted that the due process claim was 
barred by the statute of limitations. In response, the 
plaintiffs argued that they stated a valid takings claim and 
that the statute of limitations should not apply because the 
Township had continued to interfere with their development 
plans after the imposition of the second lien in March 1993. 
The plaintiffs therefore asked the court to deny the motion 
to dismiss or, alternatively, to allow them to amend their 
complaint to include additional allegations. 
 
In a memorandum and order dated December 16, 1999, 
the District Court dismissed the takings and due process 
claims, declined to allow the plaintiffs to amend their 
complaint, and dismissed the state law claims without 
prejudice after declining to exercise jurisdiction over them. 
 
The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Richard Cowell had apparently conveyed his interest in Lot 14 to 
Eileen Cowell in January 1992 as part of a divorce settlement. 
 






A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded 
allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in 
the light most favorable to plaintiff, the plaintiff is not 
entitled to relief. See Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 
481-82 (3d Cir. 2000). We have plenary review of a district 
court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). See id. We review a district court's refusal to allow 
a party to amend its complaint for abuse of discretion. See 
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1434 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
A. Takings Claim 
 
The plaintiffs allege that the Township and various 
township officials violated the Takings Clause by imposing 
two municipal liens that impaired the value of the plaintiffs' 
properties and deprived them of their right to full control of 
their properties. The District Court ruled that the takings 
claim was not yet ripe because the plaintiffs had not yet 
availed themselves of the state procedures for seeking just 
compensation. In the alternative, the court held that the 
defendants' alleged actions did not rise to the level of a 
taking. 
 
The Fifth Amendment proscribes the taking of private 
property for public use without just compensation. See U.S. 
Const. amend. V. It is well-recognized that this prohibition 
applies to state and local governments under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). The 
Supreme Court has recognized that just compensation need 
not be paid in advance of the taking -- "all that is required 
is that a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for 
obtaining compensation exist at the time of the taking." 
Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank 
of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (quotation 
omitted). Therefore, if a state has provided an adequate 
procedure for seeking just compensation and a landowner 
has used those procedures to obtain just compensation, 
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there is no violation of the Takings Clause. See id. It follows 
that "if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking 
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a 
violation of the [Takings] Clause until it has used the 
procedure and been denied just compensation." Id. at 195. 
 
Pennsylvania's Eminent Domain Code provides inverse 
condemnation procedures through which a landowner may 
seek just compensation for the taking of property. See 26 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 1-408, 1-502(e), 1-609.2 Indeed, 
many landowners have invoked these procedures to seek 
just compensation for takings. See, e.g., In re Prop. Situate 
Along Pine Rd. in Earl Township, 743 A.2d 990 (Pa. 
Commw. 1999); Gross v. City of Pittsburgh, 741 A.2d 234 
(Pa. Commw. 1999); Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth. v. 
WBF Assocs., 728 A.2d 981 (Pa. Commw. 1999). 
 
In the case at hand, the plaintiffs do not contend that 
they attempted to use these procedures but were denied 
just compensation. Instead, they argue they were not 
required to file an inverse condemnation petition because 
the Township did not have legal authority under the 
Eminent Domain Code or any other power to impose the 
liens. In addition, they claim that they "exhausted state 
remedies" by raising the merits of the two liens in 
bankruptcy court. 
 
We reject the plaintiffs' arguments. The plaintiffs' ability 
to file an inverse condemnation petition in state court in 
order to obtain just compensation was not related to the 
Township's right to impose the liens. In addition, 
adjudication in federal bankruptcy court is not an 
appropriate alternative to the state inverse condemnation 
procedures. As the Township notes, the bankruptcy courts 
never determined whether there had been a taking of the 
plaintiffs' property. Because the plaintiffs have not availed 
themselves of the appropriate procedures under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Under Pennsylvania law, a landowner may file a petition requesting 
the appointment of viewers to declare a taking and ascertain just 
compensation. See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 1-502(e). If the landowner 
is successful, then s/he may also be awarded reasonable appraisal, 
attorney, engineering, and other costs incurred. See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 1-609. 
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Pennsylvania law to obtain just compensation, we agree 
with the District Court that their takings claim is not ripe. 
 
Even if the plaintiffs' takings claim were ripe, the 
defendants' actions do not amount to a taking. The 
plaintiffs argue the two liens amounted to a regulatory 
taking because the liens forced them to reduce the sale 
price for their properties and caused them financial 
distress. However, a regulatory taking occurs only when the 
government's action deprives a landowner of all 
economically viable uses of his or her property. See Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 
(1992). 
 
A municipal lien does not deprive the landowner of all 
economically viable uses of the property. Rather, a lien is 
merely "a charge upon property by which a lien creditor has 
the right to execute on that property in order to satisfy a 
debt or other obligation." Unity Sav. Ass'n v. Am. Urban Sci. 
Found., 337 Pa. Super. 470, 474, 487 A.2d 356, 358 
(1984). Under Pennsylvania law, the filing of a lien does not 
affect the debtor's use of that property until foreclosure. 
See Winpenny v. Krotow, 574 F.2d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(citing 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 7181). Though the liens in the 
case at hand may have prevented the plaintiffs from 
entering into certain transactions, they did not foreclose all 
economically viable uses of the land. Therefore, we agree 
with the District Court that the imposition of the liens did 
not constitute a taking.3 
 
B. Due Process Claim 
 
The plaintiffs also allege that the imposition of the two 
liens, one for $25,000 and the other for $250,000, violated 
their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The District Court held that these claims were barred by 
the two-year statute of limitations for claims brought under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We are compelled to note that we regard the imposition of the liens as 
of questionable propriety; at argument, counsel for the defendants 
attempted to explain why the Township resorted to the liens, but offered 
no legal authority to justify them. The liens imposed for anticipated non- 
payment for municipal improvements may have violated the Municipal 
Lien Code, 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 7101 et seq. 
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42 U.S.C. S 1983. The court specifically ruled that the 
continuing violations doctrine did not apply because the 
defendants' last affirmative act occurred in 1993 with the 
imposition of the second lien. 
 
As the plaintiffs concede, the applicable statute of 
limitations for their S 1983 claims is two years. See Sameric 
Corp. of Delaware v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 
(3d Cir. 1998). They argue, however, that the continuing 
violations doctrine should have been applied to toll the 
limitations period because the defendants engaged in a 
"continuing campaign of affirmative acts" that interfered 
with their substantive due process rights. Br. of Appellants 
at 23-24.4 
 
The continuing violations doctrine is an "equitable 
exception to the timely filing requirement." West v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Thus, "when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing 
practice, an action is timely so long as the last act 
evidencing the continuing practice falls within the 
limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant 
relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be 
time barred." Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of 
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d 
Cir. 1991). 
 
In order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant's conduct is "more than the 
occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts." West, 45 F.3d at 
755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry, we have 
recognized that courts should consider at least three 
factors: (1) subject matter -- whether the violations 
constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to 
connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency -- 
whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of 
isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-- whether 
the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger 
the plaintiff 's awareness of and duty to assert his/her 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The District Court noted that the plaintiffs appeared to assert both 
procedural and substantive due process violations. Plaintiffs do not 
argue on appeal that their procedural due process rights were violated, 
so we will limit ourselves to the substantive due process claim. 
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rights and whether the consequences of the act would 
continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to 
discriminate. See id. at 755 n.9 (citing Berry v. Board of 
Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 
(5th Cir. 1983)). The consideration of "degree of 
permanence" is the most important of the factors. See 
Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. 
 
The continuing violations doctrine has been most 
frequently applied in employment discrimination claims. 
See, e.g., West, 45 F.3d 744; Bronze Shields, Inc., v. New 
Jersey Dept. of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir. 
1981); Jewett v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 653 F.2d 89, 91 
(3d Cir. 1981). However, this has not precluded the 
application of the doctrine to other contexts. See Brenner, 
927 F.2d 1283 (applying the doctrine to a claim brought 
under the National Labor Relations Act); Centifanti v. Nix, 
865 F.2d 1422, 1432-33 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying the 
doctrine to a procedural due process claim brought under 
S 1983). 
 
At issue in this case is whether this equitable doctrine 
should be applied to toll the statute of limitations for the 
plaintiffs' substantive due process claim.5 The plaintiffs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. After oral argument, we requested letter briefs from the parties to 
address, inter alia, the issue of the applicability of the continuing 
violations doctrine to substantive due process claims generally. The 
submissions of both parties were comprehensive and we express our 
appreciation. Plaintiffs argued that our decision in Sameric Corp. of 
Delaware v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599-600 (3d Cir. 1998), 
accepted that the continuing violations doctrine could be applied to 
substantive due process claims but merely held that the evidentiary 
record did not support its application to the facts of the case. The 
Township disputed this interpretation of Sameric  and argued that the 
doctrine should not be extended to apply to substantive due process 
claims. 
 
After consideration of the jurisprudence on the continuing violations 
doctrine, we do not find it necessary to adopt a per se rule of its 
applicability to substantive due process claims. Most importantly, the 
doctrine is an equitable one and requires a factual analysis that will be 
different for each case. Therefore, we will limit ourselves to whether the 
continuing violations doctrine should apply to the plaintiffs' substantive 
due process claim in the case at hand. 
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appear to offer two theories for application of the 
continuing violations doctrine here. First, they argue that 
the two municipal liens were continuing violations of their 
substantive due process rights until they were either lifted 
or expunged. Specifically, the $25,000 lien remained in 
effect until July 13, 1998, when it was expunged by a 
bankruptcy judge. The $250,000 lien was in place until 
July 1, 1997 at the earliest, when Eastgate negotiated its 
bankruptcy reorganization plan which included a $30,000 
payment to the Township for settlement of that lien. 
Therefore, according to the plaintiffs, their substantive due 
process claim was timely raised because their complaint 
was filed on June 25, 1999. 
 
We disagree with the plaintiffs' interpretation of a 
continuing violation and therefore reject this theory. The 
focus of the continuing violations doctrine is on affirmative 
acts of the defendants. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 
449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; 287 
Corporate Center Assoc. v. Township of Bridgewater , 101 
F.3d 320, 324 (3d Cir. 1996). The mere existence of the 
liens does not amount to a continuing violation. Neither 
was the Township's refusal to remove the lien an affirmative 
act of a continuing violation. 
 
The cases cited by the plaintiffs do not require a different 
result. In United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947), 
a landowner brought a claim against the federal 
government seeking compensation for flooding of lands that 
had been authorized by the government. The government 
argued that the claim was time-barred but the Supreme 
Court disagreed. The Court held that the flooding was a 
continuous event and therefore the limitations period began 
to run when the flooding had stabilized, rather than when 
the flooding first began. See id. at 749. Dickinson was a 
unique situation in which the physical taking of property 
was not complete until the flooding had stabilized. We have 
previously declined to extend its holding to toll the running 
of a limitations period for a substantive due process claim, 
see 287 Corporate Center Assoc., 101 F.3d at 324, and we 
similarly decline to extend its holding here. 
 
The plaintiffs also cite to the decision in Gordon v. City of 
Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978). In that case, a 
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developer had been prevented from completing construction 
of an apartment complex by a city ordinance that was later 
held to be unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that 
the developer's subsequent takings claim was not time- 
barred because the alleged wrong was the "continuing 
course of action which made it impossible for the plaintiffs 
to enjoy the full use of their property." Id.  at 391. 
 
The Sixth Circuit has since declined to follow Gordon, see 
Kuhnle Bros. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 521 n.4 
(6th Cir. 1997), as have other courts of appeals, see, e.g., 
Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare County Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 
103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983). In Ocean Acres, the Fourth 
Circuit reaffirmed that "[a] continuing violation is 
occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill 
effects from an original violation." Id. (quotation omitted). 
This conforms with our understanding of the continuing 
violations doctrine, see Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599, and we 
see no reason to depart from it. Therefore, we reject the 
plaintiffs' first theory for application of the continuing 
violations doctrine. 
 
The plaintiffs' second theory is that the Township 
engaged in a campaign of harassment against them that 
extended beyond the imposition of the two municipal liens. 
In particular, they identified the following five acts that fell 
within the two-year limitations period in their 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion to 
Dismiss submitted to the District Court: 
 
(1) On July 1, 1997, as part of Eastgate Corporation's Plan 
       of Reorganization in bankruptcy, the parties negotiated 
       a $30,000 payment from Eastgate to the Township in 
       return for a discharge of the $250,000 municipal lien 
       imposed on the Palmer Business Park property. 
       Although this $30,000 payment was made, the 
       Township later requested an additional payment of 
       $23,000 before the lien was discharged. This additional 
       request allegedly violated 11 U.S.C. S 1141. 
 
(2) In August 1997, the Township required lot purchaser 
       Lone Star Steakhouse to build a driveway to the Tic- 
       Toc Diner as a condition to issuing a building permit. 
       As a result, Eastgate was compelled to reduce the price 
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       of the lots it was selling to Lone Star Steakhouse by 
       $25,000. 
 
(3) In May 1998, the Township required Eastgate to fund 
       the installation of a stop light in or near Lot 11. 
       Consequently, Eastgate was compelled to reduce the 
       sale price of Lot 11 by $75,000. 
 
(4) In January 1999, the Township required purchasers of 
       Lot 11 to pay $5,000 to the Township for the 
       installation of stoplights as a condition of issuing 
       building permits. 
 
(5) On February 13, 1999, the Township sent Eastgate a 
       bill for engineer fees related to a September 1994 
       inspection of the Palmer Business Park property. 
       Eastgate claimed it was not responsible for this bill, 
       which was sent over five years after the inspection took 
       place. 
 
App. at 155-156. In addition, the plaintiffs argued before us 
that the Township has continued to harass them by filing 
a petition to the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton 
County on December 15, 2000 requesting further 
improvements. The plaintiffs contend that they should be 
allowed to amend their complaint to include these and 
other allegations. 
 
Although these acts fall within the two-year limitations 
period, we must consider whether they are "isolated, 
intermittent acts" or part of a "persistent, on-going pattern." 
West, 45 F.3d at 755. In doing so, we will consider the 
three factors identified in Berry v. Board of Supervisors of 
Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983). 
First, with regard to the "subject matter" of the violations, 
we note that these acts, except for the first one, appear to 
be unrelated to the imposition of the liens. The plaintiffs 
attempt to link these acts by characterizing them as a 
general interference with property rights. However, our 
substantive due process jurisprudence has always focused 
on the particular acts of the defendant, and not a general 
interference with property rights. See, e.g., Woodwind 
Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 
2000) (considering the alleged delay of permit approval for 
subdivision plans); Blanche Road Co. v. Bensalem 
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Township, 57 F.3d 253, 268 (3d Cir. 1995) (considering the 
intentional blocking or delay of the issuance of permits for 
reasons unrelated to the merits of the permit application). 
Indeed, the plaintiffs argued at oral argument that each of 
these acts was an independent violation of their substantive 
due process rights and therefore individually actionable. If 
so, then the appropriate course of action was to bring a 
new S 1983 claim with respect to these alleged harassments 
instead of trying to tack them on to their existing claim. 
 
In this respect, this case is not unlike the situation that 
was before us in Sameric, 142 F.3d 582. In that case, a 
theater owner alleged substantive due process violations 
against the City of Philadelphia and various city officials for 
improperly designating the theater as an historic building 
and improperly denying a permit to demolish the theater. 
Although the denial of the demolition permit occurred 
outside the applicable two-year statute of limitations, the 
owner argued that the statute should be tolled because the 
denial of the permit was related to the historical 
designation and the owner had continued to dispute the 
historical designation in state court. We rejected this 
argument, noting that the denial of the permit gave rise to 
an independent cause of action and should have been 
pursued as such. Thus, we held that the continuing 
violations doctrine could not be applied to revive the claim 
involving the permit denial. See id. at 598-600. Because the 
case at hand is similar to the situation in Sameric, the first 
Berry factor weighs against finding a continuing violation. 
 
With regard to the "frequency" of the acts, we note that 
courts have never set a specific standard for determining 
how close together the acts must occur to amount to a 
continuing violation. The plaintiffs assert on appeal that 
defendants engaged in a campaign of harassment that 
began as early as 1987, became exacerbated with the 
imposition of the liens in October 1992 and March 1993, 
and continued throughout the mid and late 1990s. Many of 
the alleged harassing acts deal with routine dealings 
between a land developer and a board of supervisors that 
would not amount to violations of substantive due process. 
In any event, this would be a different due process claim 
than that pled in the complaint, which was confined to the 
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imposition of the liens. The type of acts that would satisfy 
the "frequency" factor of the Berry inquiry must at least be 
acts of substantially similar nature to those which were the 
basis of the original claim. 
 
Turning to the third Berry factor -- whether the acts had 
a "degree of permanence" which should trigger the 
plaintiff 's awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights -- 
we must consider the policy rationale behind the statute of 
limitations. That is, the continuing violations doctrine 
should not provide a means for relieving plaintiffs from 
their duty to exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing their 
claims. See Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh , 947 F.2d 
1158, 1168 (4th Cir. 1991); Ocean Acres, 707 F.2d at 107. 
In the case at hand, the plaintiffs were aware of the 
wrongfulness of the liens when the liens were imposed in 
1992 and 1993. Therefore, the plaintiffs should have 
brought a claim to strike the liens in state court or filed a 
S 1983 claim within the applicable limitations periods. To 
allow the plaintiffs to proceed with their substantive due 
process claim now would be unfair to the Township and 
contrary to the policy rationale of the statute of limitations. 
See United States v. Richardson, 889 F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 
1989) ("Limitations periods are intended to put defendants 
on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from 
sleeping on their rights."). Therefore, this factor strongly 
weighs against applying the continuing violations doctrine. 
 
Balancing the equities of the case, we conclude that the 
continuing violations doctrine does not relieve plaintiffs 
from the statute of limitations for the substantive due 
process claim. Therefore, we agree with the District Court 
that the substantive due process claim was untimely. 
 
C. Leave to Amend the Complaint 
 
We also conclude that the court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to amend their 
complaint. Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) states that leave 
to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires," 
we have held that leave to amend need not be granted when 
amending the complaint would clearly be futile. See Maio, 
221 F.3d at 500-01 n.19. It is evident that allowing the 
plaintiffs in the case at hand to amend their complaint 
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would not have saved their takings claim. As for the 
substantive due process claim, we have held that the 
additional factual allegations offered in their Memorandum 
of Law in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss did not 
constitute a continuing violation. Therefore, that claim 
would not be able to overcome the statute of limitations, 






For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District 
Court's order dismissing plaintiffs' action. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The plaintiffs also contend in their brief that the District Court 
erred 
in characterizing their complaint as already amended. While the court 
may have erred in this regard, we do not see this error as warranting a 
reversal. 
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